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MERGERS AND ALLIANCES
IN THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

David A. Menachof
University of Plymouth
Anthony Damian
Norasia Services SA

This article chronicles the history of mergers and alliances in the liner shipping industry during the past
century before focusing on the latest wave of mergers to hit the industry Each merger wave in the liner
shipping industry generally coincided with merger waves from the general industrial world. The
incentive for each wave of mergers seemed to be different, with the most recent wave focusing on synergy
between the merging companies. The reduction of competing firms through mergers has implications for
the shipper and these are also examined.

INTRODUCTION
In the present decade, mergers and strategic
alliances have become the model for liner
shipping companies in coping with the
globalization of the world economy. The present
day competition and rise in the cost of capital has
resulted in a steady fall in profits. Liner shipping
companies "are characterized by operating
scheduled services between predetermined
ranges of ports on a continuous basis." (U.N.)
Most liner shipping service today is focused on
containerized freight traffic. Competition in the
liner shipping industry has been in existence
since the days when sailing ships were
introduced. The intense competition at the turn of
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the last century can be compared to the present
day competition in the liner shipping industry.
The commonality between the two periods
represents an attempt to increase price stability
and profitability. This paper will chronicle the
merger history of the liner shipping industry and
conclude with the current rationale for the most
recent wave of merger activity and how it might
affect the shipper.
HISTORY OF THE MERGERS
AND THE MERGER WAVE CYCLE
Four periods of high merger activity, called
merger waves, can be identified in the history of
US and UK industrial development. During these

periods, consolidation of various industries took
place. The liner shipping industry was one such
industry affected by these merger waves. In the
US, these industrial merger waves occurred
between 1897-1904; 1916-1929; 1965-1969, 19841989, and most recently in the early 1990’s
continuing to the present. The reason for the
occurrence of these merger waves was different
for each period. The first wave resulted in
monopolistic merger, the second wave for
oligopoly, the third wave for conglomerate
merger, the fourth wave was the period of hostile
and mega-mergers and the present day merger's
objective is strategic gains (Gaughan 1996). The
merger activity in liner shipping has coincided
with the merger activity in other industries.
Mergers, acquisitions and alliances in the liner
shipping industry have always occurred in a
periodical wave manner. From the data collected
(see Appendix), the merger waves in the liner
shipping industry can be categorized into four
periods, 1875-1898; 1914-1926; 1964-1973; and
1981-1989, which with little exception correspond
to the general industrial merger waves. The
present day merger activity can be traced from
1995-present day. These periods of merger waves
saw increased activity of mergers, acquisition
and alliances.
The First Merger Wave: 1875-1898
In the late 19th century, steamships used to
regularly ply between Europe and India/Far East,
but the competition was not very severe. The
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which reduced
the voyage duration, increased the effective
earning capacity of each vessel and created
cutthroat competition among the shipowners,
finally resulting in the formation of shipping
conferences. It was one of the first types of
mutual pact among shipowners to protect their
interests. In the following years, many
conferences were formed to safeguard shipowner
interests (Deakin and Seward 1973). The period
before 1900 saw heightened activity in the
formation of shipping conferences and the period

between
activity.

1890-1898

saw

increased

merger

This merger wave occurred after the depression
of 1883 and peaked between 1898 and 1902.
General industry mergers during this period were
horizontal and often resulted in a monopolistic
market structure (Gaughan 1991). Similar
monopolistic market structures were also
witnessed in the liner shipping industry, where
the conference system created a price cartel. An
example to this effect was rate fixing set by the
shipowners of the Calcutta conference for the
carriage of tea (Deakin and Seward 1973). It was
financial factors which forced the end of the first
merger wave, including the collapse of the
shipbuilding trust in 1900 and the crash of the
stock market in 1904 in the US (Gaughan 1991).
The Second Merger Wave: 1914-1926
The second wave of mergers in the liner shipping
industry occurred during the First World War and
continued until 1926. While the first wave was
merger for monopoly, the second wave was
merger for oligopoly. The booming economy after
the first World War provided the investment
capital for these mergers (Gaughan 1996). During
this period, the largest merger was that between
British India Steam Navigation Company and the
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation
Company, followed by the Ellerman Lines & Hall
Lines merger to form Ellerman Line (Deakin and
Sewrard 1973). The second merger wave ended
with the stock market crash of 1929.
The Third Merger Wave: 1964-1973
The third merger cycle occurred between 1964
and 1973. The introduction of container services
to the liner trades in the mid 60’s brought in a
revolution, not only in handling methods, but also
in the whole structure and operation of general
cargo transportation. The desire to build
container ships and the related specialized
handling facilities in ports required heavy, capital
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intensive investments. Mergers during this wave
transpired due to the heavy investment
requirements of containerization, which made it
virtually impossible for a single liner shipping
company to undertake alone (Fossey 1996).
Again, the mergers in the liner shipping industry
coincided with the merger wave of other
industries. Mergers in the third wave were
conglomerate in nature (Gaughan 1991). Several
mergers and consortia were formed during this
period such as Overseas Containers Ltd (OCL), a
closely knit pooling and joint marketing firm
comprising British & Commonwealth, Furness
Withy, Ocean Transport & Trading and P&O. The
purpose was to formulate and develop strategy
for converting UK-Far East liner services to
containers. A year later this was followed by
other UK-based operators; Ben Line Steamers,
Blue Star Line, Cunard Steamship Co, Ellerman
Lines and T&J Harrison formed Associated
Container Transportation (ACT). The third
merger wave subsided when the stock market fell
in 1969 (Gaughan 1991).

liner shipping industry in which global
deregulation has resulted in mega-mergers and
alliances. The present day liner shipping industry
is faced with alliances such as Global, Grand.
Sealand-Maersk and mega-mergers such as P&ONedlloyd (See Tables 1 and 6).
Thus, it is clear that the liner shipping industry’
has experience merger wave cycles, which
coincided with the merger wave cycle
experienced by other industries. These merger
cycles were experienced during the bullish phase
of stock markets and during periods of a liberal
banking system fuelled by deregulation, which
are the main ingredients of mergers and
acquisitions. Therefore, it is apparent that liner
shipping is very much affected by the ups and
downs of the overall market. The ups and downs
of other industries do have an impact on liner
shipping and the statement that shipping is a
derived demand is very much true.
OBJECTIVES OF MERGERS
AND ALLIANCES

The Fourth Merger Wave: 1981-1989
The fourth merger wave occurred between 1981
and 1989 and was again different from previous
merger waves as general industry concentrated
more on hostile take-overs. During this period
few mergers took place in the liner shipping
industry. However, the airline industry
experienced
numerous
acquisitions
and
consolidations due to deregulation (Gaughan
1996).
The Current Merger Wave: 1995-Present
The present day mergers have differentiated
themselves from all previous merger waves and
have been classed as merging for strategic gain.
This is very much true with liner shipping where
mega-mergers and alliances have been formed
due to increased competition and reduced profits.
Deregulation in the airline industry resulted in
mega-mergers; similar effects can be felt in the
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As with all business activity, there must be
justification for engaging in either a merger or an
alliance. We look at the theoretical basis for
acquiring strategic gain in terms of synergy and
then examine whether or not they apply in the
"real world" based on actual merger activities.
Synergy
Synergy basically refers to the coming together of
firms to produce a corporate combination which
is more profitable than the sum of the individual
firms profit combined (Gaughan 1991). There are
two types of synergy that firms try and exploit
when participating in mergers and alliances;
Operating Synergy and Financial Synergy. Both
are explained briefly in the following paragraphs.
Operating Synergy
Operating synergy refers to the efficiency gains

or operating economies that are derived in
horizontal or vertical integration. Cost reduction
is one of the main sources of operating synergy as
a result of economies of scale, due to the
reduction in the per unit cost that results from an
increase in the size or scale of a company's
operations.
In the context of the liner shipping industry, the
present day merger/acquisition/alliances have
increasingly
concentrated
on
operating
synergies, especially economies of scale
(Drewery).
One of the main advantages of mergers/ alliances
is the ability to cut costs by the rationalization of
resources available to both the merging firms.
Since competition is very severe in the liner
shipping industry and the freight rates in certain
trade lanes have fallen by 25% in the last three
years (Bray 1997), the operating profit of the
companies cannot be enhanced by increasing the
freight rate. Therefore, the only alternative left is
to reduce the cost of operation by merging the
companies together. Alliances aim to cut costs by
means of slot chartering/vessel sharing
agreements, joint terminal contracts, common
use of equipment and even by the joint purchase
of ships and equipment. P&O-Nedlloyd is aiming
to achieve $100/TEU savings from their merger.
Table 1 highlights the estimated annual savings
projected by the recent alliances.

the capital may consider the firm less risky. The
risk of bankruptcy would be less, given the fact
that wide swings up and down in the combined
firm's cash flow would be less likely. As a result,
the banks feel confident enough to lend money to
such firms due to the lessening of the risk
element. The merger of P&O-Nedlloyd resulted in
P&O-Nedlloyd securing a credit line of $1 billion,
which will be used for financing the newly merged
line and new ships on order (Containerization
International Jan. 1997).
TABLE 1
PROJECTED SAVINGS THROUGH
MERGER/ALLIANCE

Alliance / Merger
Name

Projected Cost
Savings
(millions)

Sealand - Maersk Alliance

$ 100/Year

P&O-Nedlloyd Merger

$ 200 / Year

NOL-APL Merger

$ 130 / Year

DSR-Senator Merger

$ 65.67 / Year

A larger company enjoys more advantages in the
financial market as compared to a relatively
small company. The advantage gained is in the
form of lower costs of raising capital as it is
generally less risky than with a smaller firm. The
effect of P&O's merger reduced the group
borrowing by $354.3 million (P&O Annual Report
1996).

Financial Synergy
Stock Market Response to Synergy
Financial synergy refers to the impact of a
corporate merger/acquisition on the costs of
capital to the acquiring firm or the merging
partners. The cost of capital is lowered when the
corporate combination occurs which evinces the
presence of financial synergy (Gaughan 1991).
The combination of two companies reduces the
risk of bankruptcy, provided the cash flows are
not correlated. If the acquisition/merger lowers
the volatility of the cash flows then the supplier of

The popular objective of any company is to
increase earnings per share (EPS) and many
mergers have been justified in terms of the effect
on EPS.
Earnings per share is based on
accounting profit which is subject to accounting
policies on stock valuation, asset depreciation,
bad debts, profit on long term contracts,
provisions for accrued income and expenditure.
The price-earnings ratio (P/E) is equal to the
share price divided by the earnings per share.

Fall 1998

47

Neptune Orient Line (NOL) in April made a
friendly acquisition bid on APL for $33.5 per
share, which amounted to a total of $825 million

(Bray 1997). The individual figures of both
companies and their combined figures are
displayed in Table 2 .

TABLE 2
EFFECT OF MERGER ON FINANCIAL STATUS FOR NOL AND APL
NOL

APL

NOL + APL

EPS (US $)

$ 0.0202

$0.0211

$ 0.2008

Price/Share (US $)

$ 0.8198

$ 20.36

$ 1.5132

40.5

964.9

7.53

722,300,000

24,600,000

722,300,000

$ 14,590,460

$ 519,060

$ 145,109,520

$ 592,141,540

$ 500,856,000

$ 1,092,997,540

P/E Ratio
No. of shares
Total Earnings
Total Market Value

The earnings per share (EPS) and number of
shares are obtained from the individual
companies' profit and loss accounts for 1996. The
price per share (PPS) is the average of the share
prices 20 days before the take-over. The EPS of
the combined firm is $0.2008 , which is greater
than the EPS of the individual companies. If the
merger decision is made on the basis of EPS, then
this is an extremely profitable merger.
Another key index as to the state of a company is
its share price. A company which has not been
performing profitably for a long time must use
new strategies to give sufficient returns to its
shareholders. One of the strategies is the
merger/acquisition with/of a similar type of
company. Share prices of both merging/acquiring
companies are affected upon disclosure of the
merger/acquisition activity. The effect on the
share price depends on the expected costs and
benefits of the deal and market expectations that
the deal will actually be consummated. Studies
have shown that shareholders of acquired
companies are the big winners, receiving on
average a 20% premium in a friendly merger and
a 35% premium in a hostile take-over, whereas
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shareholders of acquiring companies receive
small returns that are not statistically different
from zero for friendly mergers (Copeland, Koller
& Murrin 1991).
Observe the case of Neptune Orient Lines (NOL)
$825 million acquisition bid for American
President Line (APL), under which NOL will
acquire all 24.6 million outstanding shares at
$33.5 per share. The day NOL made the disclosure
of its intention of making a friendly acquisition of
APL, the share prices of APL rose sharply from
$21.5 to $29.75—a rise of $8.25 (Figure 1). The
share prices of NOL rose gradually in Singapore
dollars, from S$1.20 to S$1.26, which was an
increment of S$0.06 (Figure 2).
In the case of NOL's acquisition of APL, the
premium received by the target shareholders
(APL) is considerably higher than the increase in
the share price of the acquiring firm (NOL). The
acquisition announcement has resulted in a rise
in both the companies share prices— NOL’s
share price rose by 7.2% and APL's share price
rose by 45.2% and is summarized in Table 3.

FIGURE 1
Share prices of APL, Mar Apr 97

Days before& after merger announcement

In another recent merger. Figures 3 and 4 show
the market reaction to the initial disclosure of the
merger of the liner shipping divisions of P&O and
Nedlloyd. The day the announcement of merger
was made known, the share price of P&O
increased from 517 pence (06th Sep 96) to 560.5
pence (09th Sep 96- 7th and 8th Sep being
Saturday and Sunday), which was a jump of 43.5
pence. The same reaction was demonstrated in
Nedlloyd's share price which increased from 39.5
FI (06th Sep 96) to 45.5 FI (09th Sep 96), an
increment of 6F1.
Movements of share prices before the
announcement were different in both cases but,
after the merger disclosure, synchronous
movements in the share prices can be observed
before the actual merger has taken place. This
can be attributed to the fact that the market
reaction to any event affecting either company
affects its merging partner, even though they
have not legally merged. However, the behavior
of share price acts as if they have merged.
It is observed that the percentage increase in the
share prices is identical for both the companies,
approximately 15% (See Table 4). The identical
increment in the share prices can be attributed to
the fact that the shareholders anticipate equal
gains to both the companies through the
synergies achieved through the merger.

FIGURE 2
Share price of NOL, Mar-Apr 97

Days before& after merger announcement

of merger/acquisition reflects the market's
expectation of the effect of the merger on
shareholders of the acquiring and acquired
companies. It reflects the markets expectation of
the costs and benefits of the proposed merger and
the probability that the merger will go through. A
positive reaction from the merger announcement
reflects the shareholders anticipation that the
merger will result in positive gains. A falling
share price following the announcement reflects
shareholders sentiment that the merger will not
be beneficial and they should not approve the
deal (Copeland, Koller & Murrin 1991). In the
case of the above mentioned mergers, the
reaction of the shareholders was positive.
Shareholders approve of the proposed merger
and anticipate wealth maximization in the near
future through the resulting synergies.
Based on data in Table 5, we observe that many
companies' operating profits from the liner
shipping sector have fallen.
While some
companies have reported rises, their net
operating profit has been used. These companies
are diversified into other marine and non-marine
sectors and, for many of them, the rise in the
profitability is attributed to these sectors. For
many companies, the return on investment has
steadily fallen from double digit figures in the late
1970's to near zero or below today (Lloyds List
1996 C).

The rise in the share price on the announcement
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TABLE 3
PRE AND POST-ANNOUNCEMENT SHARE PRICE ACTIVITY
Mean of Share price
20 days before
announcement

Mean of Share price
20 days after
announcement

% rise in the
share price

NOL

SS1.16

S$1.25

7.8 %

APL

US$20.36

US$29.58

45.2 %

Company's
Name

Source: Datastream International, NOL company code-997373, APL company code-944881

FIGURE 3

FIGURE 4

Share price of P&O Aug Sep 96

P)

(O

N

(\J

7

Share price of NedMoyd Aug- Sep 9S

T

Mo of days before & after announcement

No of days before & after announcement

TABLE 4
PRE AND POST-ANNOUNCEMENT SHARE PRICE ACTIVITY
Mean of Share price
20 days before
announcement

Mean of Share price
20 days after
announcement

% rise in the
share price

P&O

517.8 Pence

593.5 Pence

14.6%

Nedlloyd

38.51 Florins

44.28 Florins

14.9%

Company's
Name

Source: Datastream International, P&O company code-901127, Nedlloyd company code-912796.

As a result of the falling operating profits, liner
companies
have
entered
into
alliance
agreements, merging and acquiring each other
so that the costs can be reduced.
The oligopolistic character achieved by these
firms can be studied by understanding the
concentration ratio of these firms with respect to
the tonnage held by them. Table 6 shows that the
top 6 alliance groups will control 42.7% of the
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World's TEU in service. This percentage is
expected to increase at a steady rate due to the
cost savings accrued through the alliances and
mergers. These cost savings amassed through
alliances and mergers will be used to offset the
possible price reductions in the freight rates
charged. This trend should result in other
smaller firms merging or quitting the trade.
Firms preferring to remain independent and not
responding to these changes will end up bankrupt

I'ABLE 5
PROFIT/LOSS OF MAJOR LINER SHIPPING COMPANIES
1995

1996

Liner Operating Profit

40.1m £

30.3m £

Fall (24%)

Nedlloyd

Liner Operating Profit

57m Dfl

25m Dfl

Fall (56%)

Hapag-Lloyd

Liner Operating Profit

265m Dm

230m Dm

Fall (13%)

K-Line

Liner Revenue

1.61b US$

1.53b USS

Fall (5%)

MOL

Net Operating Profit

-4.64m US$

20.9m USS

Maersk

Tankers and liners Net
Operating Profit

1.16b Dkk

1.21b Dkk

Rise (5%)

Yang Ming

Net Operating Profit

2.82b NT$

3.67b NTS

Rise (30%)

Sea-Land

Net Operating Profit

254m USS

318m USS

Rise (80%)

APL

Net Operating Profit

68.4m USS

141m USS

Rise (106%)

ZIM

Net Operating Profit

54m US $

14m USS

Fall (74%)

NYK

Net Operating Profit

148.8m USS

208.4m USS

Rise (40%)

Hanjin

Net Operating Profit

134.3m USS

161.8m USS

Rise (20%)

NOL

Liner Revenue

1.0b USS

1.05b USS

Rise (5%)

OOCL

Operating Profit after
71.8m USS

60.2m USS

Fall (16%)

Company name

Profit type used

P&O

Financing

Fall/Rise

Rise(351%)

Source: Individual Company Annual Reports or company websites.

or absorbed by larger companies except for
companies operating in the niche market sector.
The final market structure emerging in the next
decade will be oligopolistic, given the current
regulatory situation.
Growth and Expansion of Merging Firms'
Sales and Market Share
World container trade has been increasing at a
steady pace. This has been attributed to the
growth in world trade which is steadily rising at
a rate of 8% by volume per year and wrorld ship
slots have been expanding at 22% per year,
according to figures in Containerization
International's 1997 Yearbook. The growth in
world trade results in increased market share for

the liner companies. In this expanding market,
shippers are looking closely at a carrier's ability
to provide a wide range of high quality services at
reasonable prices. Larger carriers are in a better
position to offer the variety and quality of service
desired and, therefore, should experience
significant gains in market share (Lloyd's List
1996A).
Today, shippers have focused on reducing the
number of carriers they associate with and look
to one-stop shopping for all their global shipping
needs. Liner shipping firms can only offer this
broad range of services through mergers or by
joining alliances with other companies and thus
sharing the resources and know-how.
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TABLE 6
MARKET CONCENTRATION OF TOP 6 LINER SHIPPING ALLIANCES
No

Alliance

Company

1.

Sealand-Maersk
Alliance

Total TEU

% Market Share

Sea-land Service

203,244

4.3%

Maersk

200,919

4.3%

404,163

8.6%

A.P.L

81,262

1.7%

M.O.L

126,415

2.7%

Nedlloyd

117,114

2.5%

O.O.C.L

76,419

1.6%

M.I.S.C

-

-

401,210

8.5%

85,722

1.8%

NYK/TSK

129,731

2.8%

P&O

100,243

2.1%

N.O.L

77,937

1.7%

393,633

8.4%

K Line

83,634

1.8%

Yang Ming

81,229

1.7%

183,726

3.9%

348,589

7.4%

115,815

2.5%

ChoYang

33,277

0.7%

DSR-Senator

70,908

1.5%

U.A.S.C

40,000

0.9%

260,000

5.5%

205,224

4.3%

Total alliance TEU

2,012,819

42.7%

Total World TEU

4,700,000

100%

Total
2.

Global Alliance

Total
3.

Grand Alliance

Hapag-Lloyd

Total
4.

Kawa Yang Co

Cosco
Total
5.

Tri-Con

Hanjin

Total
6.

Evergreen

Source: Containerization International Yearbook 1997
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The statistics of the container industry show
that, by the end of 1996,
the number of
containers passed the 10 million mark. If present
day growth remains steady, then by 2005, the
number of containers will reach 20 million. It is
believed that these alliances will control 85-90%
of the world's container ships (Lloyd's List
1996B).

CONCLUSION

The liner shipping industry previously has been
involved in consortia membership but the
membership was limited to cargo or revenue
sharing arrangements. Falling freight rates and
increasing costs are the reason that these liner
companies are switching from pure trade lane
arrangements to global alliance agreements
(Lloyd's List 1996A ).

The liner shipping industry in the past two years
has been in the limelight with respect to the
number of mergers and alliances which have
shaken up the industry. The whole industry is
presently undergoing restructuring. However,
the merger waves experienced in the liner
shipping industry have coincided with general
industry merger waves, which implies that the
liner shipping industry is very much dependent
on other industries and the ups and downs in the
global market very much affect its performance.
The current state of the world economy may even
take its toll on the liner shipping industry by
causing several bankruptcies before conditions
improve.

Joining forces with other carriers on a global
basis offers an easy entry into markets
previously considered impenetrable. American
President Line (APL) had for a long time yearned
to join the Europe-Far East trade and its
membership with Global Alliance has made its
entry into this trade possible without having to
spend heavily. In turn, APL has offered the other
alliance members its know-how and operational
assets in the US and transpacific. Similarly with
the Grand Alliance, NYK & NOL were able to slot
charter Hapag-Lloyd tonnage across the Atlantic
while Hapag-Lloyd wras able to take advantage of
its partners' strength on the transpacific.

The implication for shippers, as a result of this
consolidation, is less choice and higher freight
rates in the long term. Less choice for the
shipper may result in a decreased ability to serve
their customers. Although there is currently far
more capacity available than shippers' demand, a
rationalized liner shipping industry will attempt
to slow, or even stop, the growth in capacity,
creating the climate for increases in freight rates.
Today's benefits of lower freight rates may lead to
tomorrow's rate increase, as the industry
consolidates into a tighter and tighter group
controlling a greater percentage of the market
share.
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APPENDIX
HISTORICAL MERGER EVENTS OF MAJOR LINER COMPANIES:
Predecessor

Year

Event

Hapag-Lloyd

1875

Hapag bought Adler Line.

-

1875

ITK-Calcutta conference formed.

NYK

1885

N\rK was found through a merger between shipping assets of
Mitsubishi and Kyodo Unyu Kaisha.

Hapag-Lloyd

1890

Hapag bought Carr Union Line.

-

1892

Conference of North European Lines formed (North Atlantic
Conference) comprising of Hapag, NDL, Holland America and Red Star.

Hapag-Lloyd

1898

Hapag bought King Sin Line.

Nedlloyd

1908

KPM, Rotterdam Lloyd and Nederland Line merged to form Koninklijke
Hollandsche Lloyds (KHL).

P&O

1910

P&O bought Blue Anchor Line.

P&O

1914

Merger of P&O and British India Steamship Navigation.

Ellerman

1914

Ellerman lines and Hall Lines merged to form Ellerman Line.

P&O

1916

P&O acquired New Zealand Shipping Co and Federal Steam
Navigation Company.

P&O

1917

P&O acquired interest in the Union Steamship Company of
New Zealand. Hain Steamship Company and James Nourse Ltd.

P&O
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1918

P&O bought Orient Line.
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Hapag-Lloyd

1918

Hapag acquired Hamburg Line.

Hapag-Lloyd

1918

NDL acquired Bremen Line.

P&C)

1919

P&O bought Khedivial Mail Line.

K-Line

1919

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Line (K-Line) established.

P&O

1920

P&O bought General Steamship Navigation Company.

C.G.M

1920

Compagnie des Massageries Maritime acquired by Chargeurs Reunis.

A.P.L

1921

Pacific Mail Steamship Company acquired by Dollar Steamship Line.

P&O

1923

P&O bought Strick Line.

Hapag-Lloyd

1926

Hapag acquired Deutsh-Australische Dampfschiffs Gesellscaft (DADG)

C.G.M

1931

French government acquired a majority stake in the
Generale transatlantique.

A.P.L

1952

Dollar Steamship Lines acquired by Ralph K Davies.

P&O

1960

P&O bought remainder of Orient Line.

K-Line

1964

K lines merger with the Liner department of lino Line.

N.Y.K

1964

NYK merged with Mitsubishi Kaium K.K

M.O.L

1964

Merger of Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK) and Mitsui Steamship
Company Ltd.

P&O

1965

Overseas Container Line formed comprising of P&O, Alfred Holt,
British & Commonwealth and Furness Withy.

A.P.L

1965

APL merged with Natomas Company.

A.C.T

1966

Associated Container Transportation formed comprising of Ben Line
Steamers, Blue Star Line, Cunard Steamship Co, Ellerman Lines
and T&J Harrison.

-

1967

Transatlantic Shipping, Wallenius Lines, Cunard, Ellerman, Incotrans
form Atlantic Container Line (ACL).

C.G.M

1969

Transat merged its services with Navigation Mixte.

Hapag-Lloyd

1970

Hapag-Lloyd formed by the merger of Americanische PacketfahrtActien-Gesellscaft (Hapag) and Nordeutscher Lloyd (NDL).

Nedlloyd

1970

Merger of Royal Interocean Lines, Rotterdam Lloyd, Nederland Line,
VNS to form Nedlloyd Group.

CGM

1973

French state owned concerns of Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
(Transat) merge to form CGM.

Trio Group

1973

Trio Group consortium formed of NYK, MOL, OCL and Ben Line.

Nedlloyd

1980

Nedlloyd group acquires KNSM-Kroonburgh.

USline

1982

US line buys Moore McCormack.

Crowley

1982

Crowley buys Delta.

Fall 1998
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P&O

1986

P&O bought rest of the shares of O.C.L.

Global

1995

Global Alliance formed of APL, MOL, Nedlloyd & OOCL.

Grand

1995

Grand Alliance formed of P&O. NYK, NOL & Hapag-Lloyd.

Sealand-Maersk

1996

Sealand-Maersk Alliance formed.

-

1996

P&O-Nedlloyd merger.

-

1997

NOL's acquisition bid of APL.

-

1997

CMA-CGM merger.

-

1997

Hanjin- DSR senator merger.

Source: International Directory of Company Histories, Volume 5 and Volume 6
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